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res t~ent of the State of North Carolina, brought an
action in the State of Virginia against George Voss, a citizen and resident of the
State of Virginia, to enforce liability under a statute of the State of North
Carolina which provides:
ttEvery owner of a motor vehic l e operated upon a public highway shall be
liable and responsible for death c~ injuries _to person or property resulting
from negligence in the operation of such motor vehicle in the business of such
owner or otherwise, by any person legally using or o~erating the same with the
permission, express or implied, of such owner.n
At the trial the plaintiff's evidence disclosed that Voss, while in Danville Va.
loaned his automobile to Henry Yost without restriction upon its use and knowi~g '
that Yost intended to operate the ~utomobile in the State of North Carolina, and
that while operating the automobile in North Carolina, Yost negligently ran over
Schmidt. At the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence, Voss moved for summary
judgment on the ground that any attempt to hold him liable by reason of the North

3. Hans Schmidt, a cr'tizen and
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Carolina statute for Yost's actions in that State would violate Federal constitutional guaranties.
How should the court rule on this motion?
(CONSTITUTIONAL LAW) The motion should be overruled. North Carolina has the power to
make reasonable laws as to who is entitled to use her highways and under what conditions. The laws are just as applicable to residents of North Carolina as to outs iders. Hence there is equal protection and due process. The Virginia court should
give full faith and credit to the North Carolina law. See Young v. Masci, 289 u.s •

253.

4 December 1959.
1.
November of 1959, Perf ec t Investment Corporat i on was indicted in the u.s.
District Court for the Eastern District of Virgini a on the charge of having violated
the income tax laws. On December 4th, the U.S. Distri ct Attorney caused a subpena
duces tecum to be issued commanding Arthur Rassmussen, the SecreJ~ry and Treasur er
or-the Corporation, to produce at the tri al on December 14th all the books of
account and other financial records of the Corpor ati on f or t he year 1958. Rassmussen
now consults you and confesses that the producti on of such r ecords will di sclos e
that, on three separate occasions during the year 1958, he embezzled corporate f unds.
He inquires whether he may successfully refuse to produce the records on the ground
that such production will tend to incriminate him. What should you advise him?
(CONSTITUTIONAL LATtl ) I would advi se him that he must produce the books . They belong
to the corporati on and not to him. Besides the embezzlement is a crime agains t
another sovereign(the Commonwealth of Virginia)and the f act that one's testimony or
acts may show him to be guilty of a crime against another sovereign will not prevent
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2. In October of 1959, it was learned that large quantities of narcotics were bei n?
sold to school children in the City of Richmond. Se?eral raids to discover the
source of the narcotics were made by the police department thfough the use of
search warrants, but such raids were unsuccessful, it being apparent that service o:·.'
the warrants furnished sufficient advance warning to permit concealment of the
drugs. In an effort to aid the police department, and because of growing public
clamor, the Council of the City of Ricrwond enacted the following ordinance:
~The Chief of Police, and each of his duly appointed deputies, may
enter any building without warrant or other process when having
reasonable belief that there will be found therein narcotics possessed
or placa:.:'contrary to law.n
A few days after the enactment of this ordinance, the Chief of Police without warning forcibly entered the home of John Eaton, who had a lengthy criminal record and
who was strongly suspected of being a ringleader in the sale of narcotics. However,
no narcotics were found on his premises. Shortly thereafter Eaton brought an action
against the Chief of Police in the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond to
recover damages of $5,000, alleging that the defendant had been guilty of a trespass. The defendant pleaded the City ordinance in defense of the action. Eaton then
filed a replication alleging that the City ordinance was void(a)because Jt violatrd
the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution relating to searches and seizure~,
and (Q) because it also violated the Fourteenth Amendment of that Constitution.
How should the Court rule on each of the issues raised by Eaton's replication?
(CONSTITUTIONAL LAW)(a) The City or~inance does not violate the Fourth Amendment
as that amendment is applicable to the federal government only. That government is
bound by both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, while the states are only bound by
the Fourteenth Amendment. Hence the states have greater leaway than the federal
government.
(b) The question here is whether the ordinance allows unreasonable, arbitrary,or
grossly unfair search procedure. If it does it violates the Fourteenth Amendment.
If it does not, it is valid, Take one aide or the other, and argue it through. An
example of an argument for its validity is:
"'Society is vitally interested in the suppression of traffic in narcotics. The
ordinance only allows a search without a warrant when there is reasonable belief
that illegal narcotics are on the premises, and there w~s such a belief in this
case. Experience has shown that it is not practical to suppress this crime if a few
moments warning must be given. This is unlike the Supreme Court Baltimore Rat Case,
in that, in that case, the ordinance allowed entry without a warrant for mere
purposes of inspection. The rats would not disappear over night. In the instant case
the ordinance is for the reasonable enforcement of the criminal laws, and hence
valid."
4 June 1960 .
:::)t;d
.
1 un~on
. wU~
c . t co o, plc
. k e t s wer e pos t ed
l.During
the course of a strike at the Un1versa
by the uni on at the various entrances to t he plant. The plant , ~owever, continued to
operat e with the as si s t anc e of appr oximat ely fi f t y per cent of lts work forc e who
had not joined the strike but stayed on t he job, and of Ct;;)r t ain non-union people who
were hired to r eplace the striker s . I n an attempt t o dissua.de t hes e workers from
entering the plant and to induc e t hem t o join the strike , t he pickets made statement s
to them befor e the entrance of t he plant embracing obscene and insulting language .
Wilbur Rutabaga, the most voc i ferous of the picket s, was arres t ed and charged with
vi olat ing Section 40-64 of the Code of Virginia, which reads:

•

•
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"I t shall be unlawful f or any person s i ngly or i n concert with ot:1ers t o
inter fere or attempt to i nterfere wi th another in t he ex8rc i.se of hi s r ight
't o wo r k or to enter-upon t he performance of any l awful vocat i on, by the use
of f orce , threats of vi olenc e or i ntimidation, or by the use of insulting
or thr eatening l anguage di rected toward such person, t o induce or attempt to
i nduce him to cquii>iilis employment or refrainfi'om seeking empl oyment . 11
Rutabega def ended upon the grounds that t his legislat i on is an abric!gment of f ree
epeech a nd is invali d clas s leeislation. I s this true?
(CONSTITUTIONAL LAW) No. The s t atute is a reasonable exerc ise of the police power t o
carry out the public policy of thi s st at e on a controver sial sub.jec-t,. There is no
fre edom of speech fo r obsceni ties and pure insults. See 191 Va . 857 on p.l824 of t he
Constitutional Law Cases of these notes.

•
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2. A statute of one of the states of the Union, Code #1234, requires all persons who
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have been licensed by the state as lawyers, doctors , architects, engineers and
ministers of the Gospel, and all persons ,.vho should thereafter apply for permission
to practice those professions in the s tate, tottake the following loyalty oa th:
"I,
, do solemnly s~vsar that I am 1vell acquainted with the terms·
of Code #1234, and I have carefully considered the pame; that I have never,
directly or indirectly, done any of the acts tha t Sec tion specifies and
prohibits; that I will support the Constitution of t he St ate; that I make
this oath without any mental reservation or evasion and hold it to be bindirJg
upon me."
That statute further provides t hat any person l :Leens ed to practice any one or more
of those professions in the state who shall re.fuse to t ake t he oath shall lose his
license to practice. The statute also provides that any ' per son who thereafter continues to practice any one or more of t hose profess ions \vithout t aking the oath
shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine and i rnprisonmE:rrt, and any person
w ho shall take the oath falsely shall be guilty of perjury . Mr . Script, who had
prior to the enactment of that s t atute been licensed by t Le state a s an ordained
minister, consults you. He advises you that he believes he had , prior to the adoption of that provision of the s t a.tute, violated the terms of that statute, and he is
unwilling to take the oath. He wishes to l~now· whether the state has the right to takE
away his license as an ordained minister.
'tlfuat would you advise?
(CONSTITUTIONAL LAW) No. The act is invalid because it is ex post facto, a bill of
attainder, and, so far as ministers of the gospel are conc erued, violation of our
policy of separation of church and state.
\\~~
·
·
4Dec.l9,60
.519. •
l.frn April~ 1960, Barnhill was indicted by the grand jury of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, for the armed robbery of the
employees of Tidewater Federal Loan Company. Armed robbery of a Federal savings and
loan association's employees is a capital offense by Federal statute. In May,l960,
Barnhill was indicted for armed robbery of the same employees by the grand jury of
the Corporation Court of the City of Norfolk. Both indictments referred to the same
occurrence.
In June, 1960, Barnhill was tried for the Federal offense and acquitted by the
jury, after which Barnhill moved the Corporation Court of the City of Norfolk to
dismiss its indictment against him. He assigned as grounds for his motion to dismiss
(a)that a trial on the State indictment would be in violation of the Fifth Amendment
to the United States Constitution, and(b)that his trial in the State Court would
constitute a denial of due process to him under the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. Assuming that there is no statute of Virginia governing
the problem, how should the Court rule on grounds(a) and (b)?
(CONSTITUTIONAL LAW) (a)The Fifth Amendment i s a restrictiqn on the United States
and not on any state so his motion to dismiss for this reason should be overruled.
(b) Nor is there any violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The act was a crime
against the Commonwealth of Virginia also, and it is entitled to try him unless
such trial is prohibited by some statute. See 359 u. s .121. Note: Virginia has such
a statute:, to wit V#l9.1·259 •

2;>~he Constitution of State A. provides:

ttNo individual or corporation or association of any kind shall enter into @1Y contract to exclude persons from employment because of membership in or nonmembership
in a labor organization."
The Federal Railway Labor Act provides:
"N-otwithstanding any other statute or law of the United States, or Territory
thereof, or of any State, any carrier and a labor organization duly designated and
authorited to represent employees shall be permitted to make agreements requiring,
as a condition of continued employment, that within sixty days following the beginning of such employment all employees shall become members of the labor organization
representing their craft or class."
The Brotherhood of Trackmen and the New York and Utah Railroad entered into an
agreement requiring all trackwalkers·employed by the railroad to join the Brotherhood within sixty days or lose their jobs,
Is this provision of the contract
valid in State A.?
(CONSTITUTIONAL LAW) Yes. By the United States Constitution the Congress has control
over interstate commerce. Railroad labor is so closely tied to the operation of
trains in interstate commerce that it is subject to regulation by Congress. The
Constitution of the United States and laws passed by Congress pursuant to powers
given the United States thereunder are the supreme law of the land regardless of
state laws and state constitutions. See 335 U.S.225.
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4 December 1961.
An ordinance of the City of Aloxandria, Virginia, reads as follows: "Any person who may desire to use t!1e streets, l e.nes and other public places of the City
for the purpose of soliciting contributions, or selling any articles or things for
<::haritable or other purposes, shall first obtain a l-JTitten rermi t from the Director
of Public Safety so to do, and any person who so uses the s.:.id streets, lanes and
other public places of the City without first obtaining a permit from the Director
of Public Safety shall be liable to a f ine of not less th<m ten nor more than one
hundred dollars.fl
Culher Post, a member of a crew oi sa1esmen selling subscriptions to three of
the le ading ne~v-s magCJ.zines, was convicted in the Corporation C:mrt of the City of
Alexandria of selling subscriptions on t he straets of tha city without complying
with the above ordinance and fined the sum of $100. He has appealed the conviction
alle ging that th8 o:tdinance under which he 1·J as con-..ricted is c.n unconstitutional one
because it violates const itutional guarantees respecting freedom of speech o.nd press
How should the court ru1e?
( CCNSTI'I'UTIONAL LA.1t/) The court should rule in fc.vor of Pc·st. The ordinance is unconsti tutional for tvw 1·easons: (1) The policy of the law and the le gal principles
Hhich are to control the d.i~;retion c: tho administrat,ive officer C?.re not set forth.
On its face, it delega ~.es po ,rers es 2Emtially l eg:i.slat·.'t.VG to an dminist -..~~~tive officer, and gives to him <.lrbitr c~ry c:md capricions power t.o r,ra'1t or deny a pennit.
(2) It violates § 12 of the •i:_rgim.a Constitution 1"lhish ~)ro>:ides that rr ,, lW citizen
may freely speak, write and publish hi s sentiments on all subjects. 11 T:}e word
"publish " means "to bring before t 1 ~e public as .for sale or distribution, rr subject,
however, to reasonable police regulo.tions with resped, to traffic and the preservation of law and order . S0e 49 S.E.2d 697, lFlS Va. Ll3 at the bottom of p. 1817 of
the Constitutional Law c3.ses in 1'~~ ,3se notes.
1.
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2. DltJ!.ssume that a statute of Vir.;i n.La provides that: "It i3 unlawful for any motor
veh1 cle dealer to sell or offer i'or sale any nmv motor vehicle unless he shall have
a wri tten contract or .franchise with the manufacturer or c..uthori zed distributor or
' dealer of that particular make of ne·w motor veh~. c le."
.
.
.
Assume also that the sk1.tute proYides that . a nev.r motor velnr:le ~s def~ne~ as "a
motor vehicle v.rhich has been titled t drty (JO) day:-.> or less in other th~n lt~
manufacturer's or doaler·'s nm11e, <:'1d has not been driven more than )00 rnl~es. "
X CorlPany of Norfollc a.ppli.ed to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles to lSSue a
1

:;> ~i.

J.:Lcense that would permit i t to sell ne<><T m0tor vehi cle s . X Company has for 8ever al years had a vrell established bu ~: in8ss in t he Ci ty of Norfolk and maintat ns a
~·j e:Ll-e quipped estA
.bli shl"lent, sales room a11d repair shop, and its plant and facilities meet all statutory requirements for such an undertaking . The faciEti es
are more adequate and better than those of the average enfranchised dealer i:! tLjs
, Stc.te. HoweYer, X Company does not have a franchise with any automobile ma.nufa1:turer. The Commis sioner of Motor Vehicles refused to issue the license on the
grou.nd that the lm-J of Virginia makes it unla:tvful to issue a license to dee.l in
nev.r automobiles unless the applicant for such license is authorized to do so ty
' a written cont:-:-act or franchise with the :nanufacturer, distributor or dealer of a
particular make of vehicle .
X Company now consults you as to 1-Jhether t he statute r r;c;uiring it to have a
written cont,ract or franchise is valid. How 1o7ould you advi se X ·Company?
(CONSTITUTIONAL Lf.\.W) The statute is invalid. It is cl early class legislati on
having no lo gical relationship to the health, mo:c als or general vJelfare. Dealers
with franchises have no monopoly on inteerity. 192 Va. 627 on p. 1824 of the
Constituttonal I.a-1-J cases in these notes .

4 June 1962.
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lr~~ October l,l96l,the State Highway Dept., as authorized by statute, announced
it~ plan to build a four-lane highway from Pulaski to Wytheville, via a tunnel
through Pulaski Mountain. Bids were requested for the construction of the tun~£1.

After considering the bids received, the Department accepted the bid of Tunnel
Tubes, Inc., and a construction contract was duly entered into between the Department and the corporation.
After Tunnel Tubes,Inc., had moved all necessary equipment to the site, but before
construction was begun, the General Assembly at its 1962 session enacted a statute
pr<?Viding that no existing or future agreement for the construction of highway
tunnel~ should be valid unless approved by the Governor. Although the statute was
general in its terms, it was enacted because of a clear showing that the tunnel to be
constructed by Tunnel Tubes, Inc., was wholly unnecessary and would result in
financial loss to the Commonwealth and its taxpayers in a sum exceeding $6,000,000.
Shortly thereafter the Highway Department sought the Governor's approval of the
contract with Tunnel Tubes, Inc. This was refused, and the Depaetment promptly notified Tunnel Tubes,Inc., ti1at it would not observe the agreement. Tunnel Tube5,!nc.,
now consults you and shows that its reliance on the agreement has caused it to.incur
expenses of ~U2,000, and that performance of the agreement will cause i t to realize
a profit of not less than $1,250,000. It seeks your advJ.ce on whether it has a cause
of action against the Highway Dept. for breach of contract. What should your advise
be?
ptLge ;>oo.

•

(CONS'fi'I'UTIONAL LAW) Yes, it has a cause of action against the Highway Department.
The Commonwealth has consented to be sued for breach of contract. The legislation
in uhconstitutional since the federal constitution prohibits any state from pass inG
any law impairing the obligation of a contract. See V#8-752 and Article 1, section
10 of the Constitution of the United States •

~~

.

2~~he Legislature of the State of Tennessee enacted a statute providing that one

who conspires with another to injure a person in his trade or business, and causes
such injury, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and punished accordingly. In June of
1962 the Attorney General of Tennessee wrote a letter to Tennessee Tobacco Packers
Union, Local No.JOJ, charging it with violation of the statute and stating that he
intended promptly to bring proceedings to prosecute Local No.303 therefor. Local
No.303 has now sought an injunction in the United States District Court of Tennes~q .
to prevent such prosecution, contending in its complaint that the statute, properly
construed, is not applicable to labor union activities. The Attorney General has
filed a motion seeking dismissal of the proceeding, asserting that whether the
statute is applicable to the activities of labor unions is an issue which should be
resolved by the courts of Tennessee. How should the District Court rule on the
motion of the Attorney General?
(CONSTITUTIONAL LAW) The motion of the Attorney General should be granted. The meal"
ing of state statutes is for the state to decide. If the state decides that the
statute does not apply to l.a.bor unions then there is no need for the federal courts
to pass on the matter, and no federal question will be involved. See Harrison v.
N.A.A.C.P. 360 U.S.l67.

•

2~e constitution of one of the state~ of the union had for many years contained ~
provision that directors of corporations were obligated to the creditors of the
corporation for funds embezzled by its officers. During the existence of this proVision an officer of a corporation in that state embezzled a large sum of money be•
longing to the corporation, thus leaving the corporation insolvent. The creditors
of the corporation commenced an action against the directors to recover for their
use the amount of the money embezzled. During the pendency of this action and before
judgment was obtained the provision of the constitution fixing liability upon the
directors for embezzled funds was repealed. Immediately following the repeal the
court sustained a motion of the directors to dismiss the action. The supreme court
or the state sustained the lower court, holding that the liability created by the
provision of the constitution was not contractual but was merely penal. Upon appeal
to the Supreme Court of the United States the creditors contended:
(l) That the court was not bound by the holding of the state supreme court
that the constitution did not give a contractual right; and
(2) That the creditors' rights were protected by the Constitution of the
United States.
Are the contentions of the creditors sound?
(CONSTITUTIONAL LAW) Yes, on the authority of Coombes v. Getz,285 U.S.434(1931).
l1erely calling the provision "penal" is not enough to p- event it from being contractual as to the creditors who became such before the State Court decision. The
holding as given by the Reporter in his headnote is in part as follows:
(1) The right to enforce the liability was part of the creditor's contracts, perfected and fully vested before the repeal, and was protected by the contract clause
of the Constitution and by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
(3) The so-called reserved power of a State over corporations and their shareholders cannot be used to destroy the vested ri ghts of third persons or to impair
the obligations of their contracts.

•

•

•

"'
4 December 1962 • 580.
l.b~as 0 1 Line was denied a permit to erect a gasoline filling station by a municipal
0o~poration in Virginia. The applicable ordinance of the city provided:
11 The application for a permit will be filed with the Commissioner of the
aeyenue and by him presented to the Council for its approval or disapproval. If the application be approved, the Council shall, by ordinance,
authorize the issuance of a pennit, but if the application be disapproved
the Council shall, by ordinance, refuse to grant a permit.n
By a suit filed pursuant to the declaratory judgment act Gas 0'Line attacked the
action of the city council in denying him a pennit upon the ground that ·the ordinance
authorizing the council of the :c ity to deny a permit was unconstitutional and void.
How should the court rule upon the contention oJ Gas O•Line?
(CONSTITUTIONAL LAW) The Court should uphold Gas 0'Line•s contention. The ordinance
fails to lay down any specific standards for the guidance of the council while it is
acting in an administrative capacity. The council cannot~lidly grant or refuse to
grant its approval at its whim. To allow others to operate filling stations and to
refuse that privilege to Gas O'Line is depriving him of the equal protection of the
J.aws. Note: If the matter involved is inherently dangerous to the public, or apt to
be associated with crime(as in the case of pawnshops)or demands regulation for other
legitimate reasons(as in the case of taxicabs) and reasonable standards are laid
down by the law, then the privilege may be given to some and withheld from others.
See 199 Va.70 on p.l833 of the Constitutional Law Cases in these notes.
:){,~;

3. ·Reeves, a

•

resid~nt of Bangor, Maine.., was appointed to the of:f.j_ce of notary
public by the Governor of that State, and he appeared before the Secretary of the
State for the purpose of receiving his commission. Assume that a statute of Maine
provides as follows:
11
A notary public being required to administer oaths, no person shall be
issued a commission as a notary public of this State until he shall have
first declared his belief in the existence of God."
Reeves refused to declare his belief in the existence of God, as a result of which
the Secretary declined to issue his corrnnission. Heeves instituted a mandamus proceeding in the proper court, seeking to cornpel the Secretary to issue him the
commission, contending that the statute was unconstitutional as a violation of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. The
;>~Co

s e~; retary

•

u:::-ged that the statute wr.s not unconstitution-1.1 as to Ree-res, bec8.us e l1e
"'a'3 not compelled to hold the office of notary public. How should the court rL'. :!.E:'?
(:.;,)NSTI1'U1'IONli.L LAW) Mandemus will lifa Th8 first amendment to the Ur..ited States
C;nsti t-ution is applicable to the States th~·ough the fourteenth. Hence v;e cannot.
h~·;~ o.ny kind of a s'i:,ate religion and a belief in the e:r..istence of God cannot be
r.,:11 ~0 a condition of holding any public office. See 367 U.S.495 •
. ...4~ " ·he Constit~tion of State X require:d that every adult, citi7.en be per:nitt.E;d to
vo~e, suo\l)ect to his qualifications to vote being first detennined.
Boob, an illit.erate beachcomber, was domicil ed in State X but had never been
registe-red to vot'3 therein. His interest in good eovernm€.nt. having been awakened,
Boob r•Jquested the voting registrar of his home county to :t:·egister him so that he
could vote in the forthcoming election. The registrar read to him a portion of the
Constitution of State X, as follows:
"Evei~y person presenting himself for regi~tration shal:!. , unless incapable solel.;r
becau.se of physical impairment, be able to re::td and wri t a any section of the
Cons-c,i tution of tl.1is State in thtJ English J.anr~uage. It 5hall be the duty of
each county regisr.rar tv adminiet.er the provi:.d ons of t..~1is s ection. 11
Boob was unable to read or w;:-i te any parts of tho C.:cnE. ti tution, so that the
registrar refused to register him . Boob inst.it.uteu tbe proper proceeding in a Cutil 't.
of State X, seeking to have th") a.hove r0.quiremflnt declared u::1constitutional as a
denial of the rights ~uaranteeC:. him ~nd.or the li'P.d.f;ral Constitution.•
How should the cow.· -~ :rule?
(CONSTITUTIONAL LAW) The re,p i:.:er,l ent the. t one must bn able to read 3.nd write the
English language(a literacy t~st that is fa~rly applied) i3 a reasonable requirement
for the right to vote. The abiJJ. t.y to r oad C~.nd wr:i. te Englitih is nec.;)ssary for any
intelligent choice of public, courses of acUon. See 360 UoS.45.

p03
4 Dec ember, 1963.
1. sa.feway Trucking Company operated a freight line from Philadelphia 1 Pa., to
Jacksonville, Florida. Richmond, Va., was a transfer point. Thefts of liquor shipments occurred at the transfer terminal, and the manager complained to a F.B.I.
agent, telling him that he suspected Tony Amato of being connected with them. A day
or two later, the F.B.I. agent, in company with a Richmond policeman, saw Amato and
a companion, Oranto, drive up to the rear of an apartment house and saw Oranto
carry some cartons from the house to the car. The officers tried to follow the car,
but lost it in traffic. However, they later saw it parked and saw Amato and
Oranto get in it and drive off. The officers followed and again &saw the car stop at
the apartment house, and Oranto go in and come back out with th~e cartons which he
placed in the back of the car. The officers drove up, placed both men under arrest
and, upon searching the car, found two cartons .of radios consigned from Philadelphia
to Jacksonville, and one carton of clothes consigned from Alexandria, Va., to
Richmond, Va., The officers took Amato and Oranto to police headquarters and there,
after further investigation, found that all three cartons had been stolen. Oranto
was indicted in the u. S. District Court on the charge of possessing the stolen
radios and in the Hustings Court of the City of Richmond for possessing the stolen
clothes. Oranto promptly moved both C~urts to suupress the evidence as to finding
the radios and clothes.
How should each Court rule?
(CONSTITUTIONAL LAW) The evidence should be suppressed in both courts. The arrest
was illegal because without probable cause Oranto had not even been suspected of
criminal activity prior to this time. Riding in a car, stopping in the rear cf an
apartment house, picking up packages, driving away--these were all acts that were
outwardly innocent.Since there was no lawful arrest, the principle that a reasonable
search incident to an ·arrest is legal, has no application. Henry v. United States,
361 u.s.98, eo s.ct.l68.
The fourth amendment prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures is applicable
to the states through the 14th amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.643.

P

2 ~e Board of Supervisors of Albemarle County adopted an ordinance dividing the
county into six types of districts, one of which was classified as "Rural". A
Board of Zoning Appeals was created and authorized to grant or deny applications
for zoning and rezoning "as the Board sees fit, being guided in its d~cision by its
opinion as to whether or not the proposed use would be desirable or advantageous to
the neighborhood or the community or the county at large."
A property owner consults you first, as to whether the Board of Supervisors had
the right to enact a zoning ordinance and, secondly, whether the quoted ordinance
is valid.
How would you advise?
(CONSTITUTIONAL LA\AJ) (l)V#l5-968 expressly gives the governing body of any oounty
the right to enact zoning laws if certain conditions are complied with.(2)This
particular ordinance is an invalid delegation of legislative power. It fails to set
up reasonably adequate standards for the guidance of the Board ofr,Zoning Appeals.
See 200 Va.637 on p.l924 of the Corporation Cases in these Not~s..

·-
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4 June E.1:arn 1965

662 ..

3. A Flori da s t atute granted women an absolute ex empt-io:.1 from jury duty, based so1e1;v
en t heir sex . The statute provided that women were not to be put on the ,jury list
unless they had volunt ari ly registered f or juJ:>y service. Flora Brow was indic tnd
o.nd t ried befor e an all male jury f or murder in Florida, and that jur y returned a
verdict fi nding her guilty of second degree murder. The record made in the t rial
com·t showed: (l) that t he accused objected to the us e of a jury panel that did no t
i nclude women thereon, claiming that ~he panel was the product of a statute which
viOrked an unconstitutional exclusion of women for jury ser vi ce; (2) that no i.;C>rrH~n
i n the coun0y wher e the indictment was return-3d and where the accused was tried had
voluntar i ly r egistered f or jury duty; and (3) t hat the accused killed her husLand
upon l earning t hat her husband was guilty of infidel i ty.
On appeal the accused sought to obtain a reversal of the judgment of conviction
upon th~ ground that t he s tatute was unconstitutional. How should the Court rule?
(CONSTITU TIO NAL L!\.vi) The Court should rule that the statu t e is valid. Women are not
ar bitrar i ly exc l uded because of their sex. Any who wish to serve as ,jurors may
vo luntarily r egister f or jur y duty. The classification which gives thi s election
t o women is a r easomble one. See 368 U. Sc$7.
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J f ttiohmond Iron, Inc., was engag-ed in Virginia in the manufacture, sale and dis, tribution of reinforcing rodsu It maintained no office outside of Virgina, but sold
· through a manufacturer's agent in New York, who sold on commission the products of
Richmond Iron and other Companies. This agent solicited business in Pennsylvania
. personally by trips through thct. State. Orders received by the a gent were submitted
to Riclunond Iron at its Virg:in:La office, confirmed in Virginia and delivered FOB
Richmond. Pennsylvania sought to impose its 47~ sales and use tax based on products
· so received in that State, and sought to place the respons:tbility, under its
statute, on Riclunond Iron to collect the sales and use tax on all reinforcing rods
sold in the manner indicat~d, making prov-ision for reimbursement to Riclunond Iron
of a percentage so collected in payment for said collection. Upon Riclunond Iron•s
refusal, suit wa s brought in the U. S. Court of the Ea~tern District of Virginia by
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania against Richmond. Iron, Inc., to collect the tax.
Issue 1-l&S joined to test the va.lidi ty of the Pennsylvania Tax in two particulars:
(A) Did it place an improper burd<<n on interstate commerce, and
(B) Did it v·iolate the due process cla.use of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution?
How ought the Court rule?
(CONS'r!TUTIONAL LAW) 'rhe Cou.rt should rule in favor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. '.rhere is no greater burden placed on R:i:elunond Iron, Inc. vrl. th respect to its
Pennsylvania Sc'.les and the use tax than is placad on Penns ylv-ania sellers in
Pennsylvania with respeot to such sales and the sales tax, nEquality is its themestt
Hence there is no improper burdon on interstate comrr.erc e .
Nor is the due process of law clause violat,?.d. It is conmon practice to require
taxes to be lri theld by those i n the beo'~ rmsition t o withhold. This makes for
ef~onomy of collection and lessens e·Jasion. Cooperation in such matters is an
incident of good citi~enship. See 362 U.S.207.
4 December 1965.
1. The Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, a legislative enactment.: prm.rit'! e1
that the transportation of alcoholic beverages vTithin, into, or through the Str- ,_ ~
was prohibited except in accordance with regul~tions a doptad by the Alcvholic
Beverage Control Board and empower ed the Board to adopt such regulations as it
deemed necessary to confine such transportation to l cgi timate purposes. I~agula\ j ': 1~ ;::;
were adopted providing that any alcoholic beve ~:age oYer one gallon in q·'.~ .•1ti ty
being transported within, into~ or thl~ough the State should be accompan~L~:d by c.
bill of lading showing the consignor and consi gnee and the route to be ·i::ravelec:~
which must be a direct route and adhered to, and that the consignee mus t, have a
. legal right to receive the shipment at the stated de s tination.
Jack .Daniel::>, a Nor·iih Carolina Citizen, was apprehended in Virginia while driv:i nG
a truck licensed in North Carol::..na~ owned by J. T. S e Brown, a North Carolina
citizen, and loaded with 280 gallons of legally manufa ctured whiskey. D:m iels [1;; .1
a bill of lading naming a bema fide wholesaler in Dorsett, ~1aryland, as consigr·:
and J. 1'. S. Brown in Garrett, 'North Carolina, as c onsignee but not desig!lating -..t!:y
route to be traveled in Vir ~Sinia although the truck "-'l as, in f act, on the most
direct route when apprehended. Under the lartls of North Carolina, Brovm could not
lawfully receive such a shipment.
On these facts, Daniels was convicted, and the truck and cal~go vJere confiscated
under appropriate confiscatory statutes, Brown having intervened as owner of the
truck and cargo. On appeal, appellants contend ed that the conviction and confiscat.irm Al-jould be reversed on the grounds that:
(1) The law violated the rights of the appellants as citizens of North
Carolina as it lvas extra-territorial in effect and was null and void
insofar as concerning the rights of a non-resident to ship or receive
alcoholic beverages not destined within Virginia, and
(2) That such regulations concerning transportation through Virginia constituted an undue burden on interstate commerce.
How s hould the appellate court rule on each of these contenti.ons?
(CONSTIUTIONAL LAW) Both contentions are without merit. The 21st amendment to the
u.s. Constitution permits the states to regulate the sale and transportation of
alcoholic beverages within the states and prohibits shipments into those stat es in
violation of their laws. The regulations in the instant case are reasonably
necessary to ~rcvent local diversions of interstate shipments of liquor. The
Virginia law only applies while the liquor is being transported through Virginia
and hence is not ex:tra-terr~torial. The burden on interstate commerce is one that

9.~~es, Keer and Long executed ane delivereq their promissory note for $5,000 to
Murray. The note was not paid at maturity and Murray instituted action thereon
against the three makers. The Clerk of the Court issued and delivered to the
Sheriff notices of the motion for judgment, and the Sheriff delive-red one copy
thereof to James in person on April 6, 1966; on the same day he mailed another to
Ke.ar, and next day seeing Long on the street said to him: nr have at my office a
notice of motion for judgment for you to appear before the Circuit Court of
Roanoke County within the next twenty-one days to answer on that note you gave
Murray for $5 1 000. You have plenty of time to get a lawyer and defend the case, if
you can. You had better attend to it; he might get judgment against you.tt
Neither James, Keer or Long appeared and judgment was entered against all three
of them on the note on May 2, 1966.
James is insolvent and Keer and Long seek your advice on May 25th as to whether
they can have this judgment set aside as to them or either of them.
How ought you to advise them?
(CONSTITUTIONAL LAW) Both Keer and Long may set aside the judgment against them as
they have a constitutional right to personal service of process upon them respectively. Va. Constitution#ll; 4th Ed. Burke, #353; 205 Va. 927; 120 Va. 30.

•

~'~rman Douglas was placed on trial in the Hustings Court of the City of Richmond

for the crime of murder in the first degree. After a lengthy trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty and Douglas was sentenced to life imprisonment. From this
judgment, Douglas was granted an appeal by the Supreme Court of Appeals. On the
appeal it was held that the lower court had committed error in instructi ng the jury
and the conviction of Douglas was set aside. Shortly thereafter, Douglas was again
brought to trial in the Hustings Court on the same indictment , He def ended on the
ground tha t he WD.S being placed twice in jeo par<.~. y cont ar y to the 5th and 14th
Amendments, and moved t hat the case be dismi ssed. How should the Court rule on this
defense?
(CONSTITUTIONAL LAW) The Court should deny the defense. Where t he accused successfully s eeks review of a convi ction, there i s no double j eopa:cdy upon a new tri al.
Further~ even whr::re the::-e i s a new trial after co,17ic tion bee;c..use of errors
it i s
not the sor t of ha rdship to t he accused that is fo rbidden by t he 14th Amen~ent.

9~tr{ ordinance of a 6ity in Virginia controlling t he grant i ng or denial of permits
f or th e er ection of gas oline service s t ation provi des :
"The appl i catio n f or a permi t shall be f iled with the commissio ner of t he
Revenue and by hi m presented to t he Counci l f or its appr oval or disappr oval .
I f, upon consi der at io n of t he applicatio n, th e Counc il finds that t he
publi c safety would be endanger ed by t he f i lling s t at ion fo r which
application i s made , t he Counc i l shall , by ord i nanc e , refu se t o grant
a permit ."
After a hear i ng and cons i deration of a n appl i cation for a permit , the Counc il of the
City r efused to gr ant a permi t to Tex Phi llips , not because servi ce stat ions are
i nher entl y danger ous but because t he f acts cons i der ed by t he Counci l showed that the
publ ic would be unnecessari l y endanger ed if t he service s t ation were erected a nd
oper ated. Phillips ther eupon fi l ed a bill in chancer y att acking the constit ut ional i t y of t he section of t he f oregoi ng ordi nanc e under which the r eques t was denied,
and pr aying that the Ci t y be r equired t o issue the permit . Shoul d Phi llips pr evail ?
(CONSTI TUTIONAL LAW & MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ) Yes . A city counc il i s empowe r ed both
t o l egis l ate and admini strate; i n passing upon a permit t o er ect a gas station it
is acti ng s olely i n an adminis t rat i ve capaci t y . Notwithstanding the fac t that a
council is deemed to have acted reaso nably i n the exerc ise of its police powers and
that every pr esumpt ion is in favor of t he valid ity of its ac ts , where there is no
rul e or standard pr esent in the ordinance under which t he council is to be guided
i n t he exercise of i t s admi nis trative power s , t his presumption fails and the
ordinance is voi d $ 199 Va .70 .
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3-~~trginia Fruit Corporation, a Delaware corporation authorized to do business
in Virginia, purchased insurance policies in Wilmington, Delaware, covering risks
on its property located in Virginia. The insurance company issuing these policies
was not a Virginia corporation, nor was it licensed to write insurance in Virginia.
Toaxes on the premiums paid under these policies were assessed against the Virginia
Fruit Corporation under a Virginia statute providing that if any person or corporation shall purchase from an insurer not licensed in Virginia a policy of insurance
covering risks within the state, other than through an insurance agent licensed in
Virginia, such person a~ corporation shall pay a tax of S% on the amount of the
gross premiums paid by the insured. The Virginia Fruit Corporation consults you and
inquires whether it may be required to pay the tax. What would you advise?
(CONSTITUTIONAL LAW) The Virginia Fruit Corporation is not required to pay the tax.
Not withstanding the provision in lS USC Hl012(a) that the insurance business
11 shall be subject to the laws of the several states what relate to the regulation
or taxation of such business,n such state regulation or taxation is to be kept
within the limits of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A state tax
on premiums payable under a policy insuring property located within the state
against loss or liability is invalid under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, where all the insurance transactions involved take place entirely outside
the s tate, the insurers are not licensed to do nor do business in the state, the
insured is a foreign corporation doing business in the state, losses under the
policies are payable to the insured at its principal office in another state, and
the only connection between the state and the insurance transactions is the fact
that the property covered by the insurance is physically located in the state.
370 u .s.4SL

